

knowing for some time in what direction had gone. This doubt respecting Binder's movements occasioned an uncertainty and delay in those of the French which were afterwards attended with the very worst consequences.¹ It cannot be doubted that there was some error in Napoleon's calculation as to the movements of the Prussians, and the consequent directions given to Grouchy by him.⁴ Napoleon

1 Napoleon no longer had by his Hide BerthIcr. who had accompanied him as his Chief of the Staff (Major-General) throughout his career, ilerihierhatl deserted his old friend in his distress in 1814, but Napoleon was now prepared to welcome him back, only laughingly threatening to make him appear in his dress of Captain of the Guard to Louig XVII I. Bert bier was on bin way to join Napoleon when he met his death in a inyHtcrinuH manner, either throwing himself or being thrown from a balcony. His place was taken by Soult, who had been appointed Minister of War by Louin XVIII. In December, 1814. He was a batter choice than his predecessor Dujtntt (of Baylcu), and he had appeared to throw himself into the aiiw of the Bourbons, but his good faith was suspected, and on 10th March, 1HM, he was succeeded by Clarke, the Duke of Feltre, who had long held thcHuiit nst tinder Najmleon, but who now, calculating Irishman as he was, definitely took the liourhon side.Soult joined his old commander after some hesitation, and was appointed Chief of the Staff, a po«t which I tat oust might have expected. Soult's performance of the dutiesof bin new post has lteen much critic-wed by those who believed in the perfection of the staff under Berthier, and Home of the misfortunes of the camjaigh have been attributed ti» the ilmeuw of the former Major-General. The truth is, that the service of the staff hail never been thoroughly well done, the *Mv.mnir* n/De I*»* ^im«c provu thin. It was taken for granted that an aide de c«crw/» always had a good horse and knew his way: an officer sent with a mesnage did not «htre to even iufk whore he was to find the intended recipient. If the fuihtty f«ij»p*»ii ^ there to have been failure) to give Grouchy full orders to keep in touch with the main army is to fall at nil on Sou ft« Berthier must bear the heavier hhiiti* of the failure to support Vamlanmie at Kulm-- a much gt«utcr tt(tgh«ct, and th0 absence of IrKi-lon's division from theaettul tight at Qtmttre liraitaimi Ligny can be matched by the absence of llenmottre* front Kyhtu. The truth in that the army was an improvised army, in which tin« htaff w«» pretty certain to t>e the greatest sufferer from it« rat>i-i formati«m, nitii that* when un army is beaten, the faults and failures of every om« are pointed out or invented, while when an army is sueoassful every one *In intir«»»tt*ti* in ifuytlig th« lilou in shade, a point on which the I Hike of Wellington wait very urgent aftot Waterloo.

* For Grouchy'ft part In this campaign sea hi* *Memoir** anil
the *(jbntrvntion** \$nr la *Relation* ae tit *(jamptwiw* <li* IHift
pitbtite /«ir le ^' ^n/rnl *(jintryittiU*, by

Grouchy's son, the Oointe da Grouchy; Paris, C<tmitmorot, Witt.
'A IMC*' *lie*

5, *imrw*

Marshal Grouchy, l(M9<7t^n 1815, imrw Mtirqui* rli? <f/r<*w*7iy,
Observation* writ* Oyrftntion* de, util* thruU' tie t'ttrmf*
Frtinfittiw, hv Gen-eral Gerard; Paris, 181K:) {Je'rurd, servinc
under Grouchy <*> tin* [nth of June, in command of a corps,
having fiercly rtmotiMtrateti agaittiit Grouchy!! refusal to march
to the cannon when they worn in Cull henririk. Tltn Prinmi
Edouard d'Auvergie also go'n Into Gmticby*8 cTcmduot in lilt*
Wattrltxt, p. 210, remarking fairly enough that, though
Urouchy alwnyN ili'itltil
received orders from Napoleon to keep *between* tllo i*ruMftiaiw und
Na}w>l<H>n,
" still General Jomini, while itot f(»rg<*tiing to ri%i'<>rd til*
ili*c'lfruti<iif
serves, with the great authority he that Ihii order
smutioneil in t-l-

• the St. Helena account is so conformable
in that it tells of the Emperor's "to which
the Emperor owed most of his victories,
that it cannot be doubted that